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Abstract 
This paper analyses the paradox inherent in the “top-performing” yet tightly 
controlled Singapore education system. As government controls have increased 
in complexity, existing policymaking conceptual heuristics in accounting for 
centre-periphery relationships appear inadequate. It argues that more direct 
government control is being replaced by “steering through paternalism from 
close proximity”, reflecting a more subtle centre-periphery relationship in an 
Asian context. 
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Introduction 
Singapore’s school system has been consistently described as “top performing” and 
“world leading” (Barber, Whelan, and Clark, 2010). Its students have continued to 
excel in international achievement tests such as TIMSS and PISA, and the country has 
been ranked highly worldwide in terms of innovation and economic competitiveness 
(Dutta, 2012; Schwab, 2011). Admittedly, the PISA and TIMSS measures of these 
achievement outcomes are limited to mathematics, science, and reading scores and 
additionally do not include the acquisition of a myriad of soft skills that students are 
generally thought to need in the modern economy – hence their significance can be 
overstated. Nonetheless, like Finland and other “high performing” Asian systems, it is 
undeniable that Singapore has attracted international interest seeking the “formula” 
for its academic and economic success. In an era where education and school system 
reform is seen by nation states as fundamental to their economic competitive 
advantage, the globalized economy has created its counterpart of globalized 
educational competition (Dale, 1999).  
“Performativity” (Carnoy, 1999; Ball, 2003) – the obsession with effectiveness 
and efficiency - thus applies not just at the school, district or national level, but 
increasingly at the international and global level, too. It is given added impetus by 
agencies such as McKinsey&Co, which have begun to bracket school systems into 
Article to be published in Educational Management, Administration & Leadership (in press) 
3 
 
sequential phases of development and maturity (Barber et al., 2010).  Hence, 
Singapore’s school system is recently described as having moved to the “good to 
great” phase on its school improvement journey (Mourshed, Chijioke, and Barber, 
2010).  Only one step remains – namely “great to excellent” – an “exalted” stage so 
far only attained by Finland. Apart from student outcome data on international tests, 
the phases of educational development recognized by McKinsey&Co and the location 
in and movement of school systems through them, is based on the nature of 
government policy interventions, and school leader and teacher skills and 
responsibilities concomitant with each phase. Indeed, results from a recent 
McKinsey&Co study (Barber et al., 2010) on school leadership involving a survey of 
experts, policymakers, and more than 1800 school leaders across eight high-
performing school systems worldwide, affirm that the quality of school leaders is the 
second most important school-level influence on student outcomes. Furthermore, the 
findings of the McKinsey&Co study – for Singapore as for other ‘high performing’ 
systems - showed a remarkable consistency in that school leaders of such school 
systems spend more time (than their peers in other systems) on instructional 
leadership, that is, developing their teachers, interacting with students, and 
networking and supporting fellow school leaders in teaching and learning. These 
school leaders are also prepared to meet both current and future demands. 
Acknowledging the strategic influence of school leaders, and in understanding the 
trajectory of the Singapore school system through its various phases (Gopinathan, 
Wong, and Tang, 2008), the question prompted is, “How have government 
interventions and educators’ levels of skills and responsibilities changed in Singapore 
over the past half century since its independence?” 
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According to the McKinsey&Co report, systems in the least developed phase - 
from “poor to fair” - are characterized by less skilled educators and tight centralized 
control over teaching-learning processes in order to drive further improvement in a 
concerted way, while minimizing variations across schools and classrooms. In 
contrast, at the other end of the development spectrum, systems moving from “good to 
great” feature more highly skilled educators, and provide looser guidelines on 
teaching-learning processes since peer-led creativity and innovation provides the 
impetus for raising performance (Mourshed et al., 2010).  Teachers and leaders are 
regarded as fully fledged professionals with clear career paths. It follows that 
attainment of the highest stage of “great to excellent” moves “the locus of school 
improvement from the centre to the schools themselves; the focus is on introducing 
peer-based yet system-wide interaction, as well as supporting system-sponsored 
innovation” (Mourshed et al., 2010: 20).  In other words, for school systems to move 
towards “greatness” and “excellence”, they are characterized by ever higher degrees 
of professionalism and school self-management.  
This portrait of Singapore education as a “good to great” system conveys an 
image of a highly professionalizing body of teachers and leaders, exerting increasing 
amounts of peer-led creative, school-based initiatives. By implication, one would 
expect the concomitant role for the government to be more restrained, exercising 
fewer controls. As a description of Singapore educational policy and of the school 
system, it is not readily reconciled, however, with the established, stereotypical 
account of the patterns of power and influence that have characterized Singapore 
education since its independence. Conventionally, policy-making in Singapore is seen 
as anti-pluralist, excluding of stakeholder involvement, with the government’s role 
described as pragmatic, paternalistic, and controlling (Neo and Chen, 2007; Trocki, 
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2006).  As Ng (2010) states, the education system has always been a critical vehicle 
for supporting the socio-political agenda and especially economic strategies of the 
island state since independence in 1965. In revamping the education system going 
forward, the need to introduce more diversity and innovation into the curriculum, 
pedagogy, and assessment seems compromised by the government’s continuing need 
to maintain power and control to ensure the system serves the nation’s economic, 
political, and social interests. 
Achieving this delicate balance is not unique to Singapore. It has led to the 
notion of “decentralized centralism” (Karlsen, 2000) where governments still 
maintain strong control while giving educational institutions greater administrative 
autonomy. In return for greater scope to customize policy implementation at school 
level, there is greater onus on schools to report and account for their managerial 
processes and measurable outcomes, such as student test data, to the centre. In similar 
vein to Karlsen, although reversing the terminology, Ng (2010) describes this trend as 
“centralized decentralization”, seeing it as “a new trend of centralization within a 
decentralization paradigm” (p. 284). Furthermore,  the Singapore Ministry of 
Education (MOE) frequently uses terms such as “greater school autonomy” and 
“bottom-up initiative with top-down support” in policy speeches and documents, 
indicating their preference for schools to take initiatives and for the MOE to support 
them.  
Our contention – captured in the aim of this paper - is that as the policy 
process has become more complex – especially in terms of center-periphery 
relationships, the concepts we use to define and understand the patterns of power and 
influence - such as “centralized” and “decentralized”, “autonomy”, “top-down, 
bottom-up”, and even “steering from a distance” - are increasingly under-powered and 
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imprecise heuristic tools. In some ways they are little more than clichés. There is, 
consequently, a genuine need for a more refined lexicon that authentically captures 
the subtle nuances of center-periphery relations in contemporary educational policy-
making.  
This paper aims firstly, to illustrate the complexities and subtleties of the 
policy-making process with reference to Singapore as a case study of a high-
performing Asian school system. Second, in understanding Singapore policy-making, 
it argues for a more holistic approach to policy analysis than simple reliance on 
descriptors of patterns of power and influence, and suggests a perspective predicated 
on philosophical-socio-cultural values as a complementary explanatory device.  
In focusing on the context of policy-making in Singapore, a tangential aspect 
of our argument is that policy-making occurs within the specific conditions of a socio-
cultural context (Dimmock and Walker, 2005).  Previous models and perspectives of 
policy-making are dominated by Anglo-American scholars, who have long enjoyed 
hegemony over dominant concepts and theoretical analyses. Unsurprisingly, their 
work reflects a values-laden position - usually, the tacit or explicit acceptance and/or 
advocacy of a version of what they perceive to be superior “Western style” democracy 
and pluralism. In Singapore, the socio-political configuration with its attendant values 
system is distinctly different from Western notions of democracy. In particular, 
although Singapore has a one-Party government (the People’s Action Party – PAP), 
the Party is enlightened and responsive to the wishes of the electorate through its 
close networks and outreach into constituencies. In turn, the smallness of the country 
and close proximity of the government to the electorate contributes to the 
effectiveness of policy-making by the elite bureaucracy working alongside elected 
ministers. The social capital that the bureaucracy enjoys mitigates the probability of 
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poor decision-making. Hence, although the bureaucracy may have served only one 
political Party since independence in 1965, the risks of partiality – in the Western 
sense – are not evident.  
This paper comprises four sections. The first section provides a brief profile of 
Singapore’s educational system viewed in the context of its unique socio-political 
context. The second section traces the evolution of its educational system across three 
distinct phases from independence to the present day. The subtleties embedded in 
what appears to be decentralization in the latest phase are discussed in the third 
section. An alternative philosophical-socio-cultural perspective to understanding 
educational policy-making in Singapore is examined in the fourth section. The final 
section draws implications regarding the need to contextualize policy-making within 
the prevailing philosophical-political-social-cultural values of society, an argument 
we illustrate with reference to Singapore. Indeed, we argue that an authentic 
understanding of educational policy-making in Singapore - and possibly other Asian 
systems - needs alternative concepts and heuristic devices to complement those 
conventionally used by researchers in the Anglo-American world. 
 
Background to the Singapore school system 
Singapore’s population has grown from 1.8 million in 1965 to 5.1 million in 2011. It 
has 360 state schools, with only about 20 of these independent.  As a city state, its 
origins date from 1965 when the island sought independence by breaking away from 
Malaysia, although it had finally ended a long period of British colonial rule in 1959. 
As an island state, Singapore’s population is urbanized and densely concentrated – 
hence the relatively small number of schools and their uniform size – the average for 
primary and secondary schools being 1,500 and 1,300 students, respectively (Barber 
et al., 2010).   
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Singapore’s political system is described as authoritarian, pragmatic, rational, 
and legalistic (Neo and Chen, 2007; Trocki, 2006).  Its power structure is highly 
centralized, relying on top-down control with tight constraints on civil liberties. 
Economic growth and political stability has been maintained by the paternal guidance 
of one political party, namely the PAP, which has been in power since independence. 
Singapore is not administered by politicians, but by bureaucrats in a meritocracy 
where power is gained through skill, performance, and loyalty to the nation and its 
policies (Sharpe and Gopinathan, 2002).  
Traditionally known as a “top-down, command and control” centralized 
system, Singapore schools are tightly governed by the MOE (Dimmock, 2012).  
Although small, the system is divided into four zones – North, South, East, and West - 
each of which has a deputy director in charge. Within each zone, schools are grouped 
into clusters of mixed primary schools, secondary schools, and/or junior colleges; 
each cluster is under the supervision of a cluster superintendent, and comprises 
between 12 and 14 schools (Sharpe and Gopinathan, 2002).  Principals of each of the 
schools in a cluster are accountable through their superintendent to the MOE. For a 
small system closely controlled by the center, the cluster structure provides a strong 
local base enabling the MOE to filter policy downward; superintendents to work 
closely with, monitor, and appraise individual principals and their staff; and schools in 
a cluster to share resources and good practices. Singapore students have performed at 
or near the top of international achievement tests in mathematics and science (PISA 
and TIMSS) for many years, justifying the system’s rating as one of the best 
performing in the world (Mourshed et al., 2010).  
  The tightness and alignment of the school system – hence its efficiency and 
effectiveness - is explicable through its smallness and tri-partite structure, comprising 
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the MOE, 360 schools and the National Institute of Education (NIE), through which 
every teacher in the system is trained. NIE teacher preparation programs dovetail 
closely with the MOE’s policy priorities, as does NIE’s increasingly important 
educational research agenda, funded by the MOE. The Singapore government’s total 
expenditure (both recurrent and development) on primary, secondary, and pre-
university education in FY2009/2010 was S$4,924 million or about 2% of 
Singapore’s annual Gross Domestic Product (GDP). This compares with the typical 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) figures of 5.5% of 
GDP in Nordic countries, and approximately 3% in Japan, Luxembourg and the 
Slovak Republic (OECD, 2010).  Singapore’s relatively low proportion of GDP spent 
on education is more than offset by its efficiency in using financial resources – due 
especially to its having few, but uniformly large schools concentrated in a small urban 
area. 
 
Singapore’s educational policy landscape since independence 
It is perhaps a truism that national policies reflect endeavors of a nation’s leadership 
to address imperatives confronting their country at different phases of national 
development (Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975; Gopinathan, 2007; Gopinathan and Deng, 
2006; Gopinathan, Wong, and Tang, 2008; Mourshed et al., 2010).  In this light, an 
examination of key policies in the Singapore context necessitates an understanding of 
the socioeconomic circumstances and broad goals of key policies aimed at addressing 
these imperatives and challenges in different phases of educational development. 
Three such phases have been recognized: the survival-driven (1965-1978), efficiency-
driven (1978-1997), and ability-driven (1997-present) phases. 
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Survival-driven education 
After achieving independence in 1965, Singapore had to build its economy from 
scratch, abandon its hope for a common market in Malaya following separation from 
Malaysia, and cope with the impending withdrawal of British forces in 1971, and the 
oil crisis of 1973. There were high levels of unemployment among its largely 
unskilled population. Singapore leaders were also mindful of the threat of communist 
elements infiltrating into workers’ unions and Chinese-medium schools, and racial 
tension. Consequently, the broad goals of the Singapore government during the 
survival-driven phase of educational development were to educate the population 
swiftly and build a disciplined and cohesive society – aims most effectively achieved 
through centralized educational policy-making (C. Han, 2009; Tan, 2007).  
Accordingly, educational policies focused on enabling every child to have an 
opportunity to be schooled to achieve basic levels of literacy and numeracy. A record 
large number of schools were built and the teaching force expanded correspondingly 
from 10,500 in 1959 to more than 19,000 in 1968 (Mourshed at al., 2010). These 
schools were uniform in physical infrastructure, curriculum, staff profile, and 
administration. Principals functioned as “supervisors of routine tasks” (p. 247) 
defined by the MOE in schools that accepted large student enrolments but faced a 
shortage of administrative support staff (Gopinathan et al., 2008). To enable existing 
teachers – most of whom were lowly skilled – and large numbers of newly recruited 
teachers to deliver the curriculum, the MOE introduced a teacher-proof curriculum, 
common syllabuses and attainment standards, for all schools.  
 
Efficiency-driven education 
By the late 1970s, Singapore’s concern shifted to how efficiently the educational 
system could meet the needs of the economy – the so-called efficiency-driven phase 
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of educational development. At that time, the system was accused of failing to 
produce the talents and skills regarded as necessary for a high quality workforce to 
support a vibrant capital-intensive, high value-added manufacturing industry (Carnoy, 
1999).  There was also an additional impetus for educational improvement as 
Singapore experienced its first economic recession – in 1986 - since independence. 
Consequently, the primary goals of educational policies at the time were to reduce 
performance variation system-wide and improve the quality of education in all 
schools.  
To this end, educational processes in curriculum and assessment were further 
standardized to ensure uniformly high standards. This standardization process 
culminated in the creation of the Curriculum Development Institute of Singapore 
(CDIS) in 1980 with the overarching responsibility of supervising teaching of a 
mandated uniform curriculum in all schools (Gopinathan and Deng, 2006).  The MOE 
also issued various instructional handbooks on administrative processes to principals 
for strict compliance. In 1981, it introduced the 252-page Principal’s Handbook 
providing guidance and directions on policies and administrative procedures required 
for the daily operations of a school (MOE, 1981).  Furthermore, various key programs 
in educational management were launched to help equip principals with the necessary 
managerial skills in running schools (Lim, 2007).  Principals were expected to 
function as line managers tasked to faithfully and efficiently implement the MOE’s 
policies. Furthermore, the MOE mandated annual school evaluations to ensure that 
schools were efficiently run according to policy prescription.  
The MOE also experimented with school-based autonomy via the independent 
and autonomous schools’ initiatives for a small number of outstanding state schools to 
innovate and diversify from the late 1980s onwards (Ng, 2005, 2010). It retained 
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control over strategic and professional domains while these schools enjoyed 
autonomy in less important areas. With the increase in decision-making autonomy in 
schools, in 1996 the MOE finally closed down the CDIS that had become gradually 
irrelevant.  
 
Ability-driven education   
In 1997, educational development in Singapore entered a new phase with the 
declaration of the nationwide vision of “Thinking Schools, Learning Nation” (TSLN) 
by then Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong (C.T. Goh, 1997). By the late 1990s, 
Singapore found itself increasingly reliant on technology-driven industries and 
finance and service sectors – a phenomenon associated with its emergence as a 
knowledge-based economy (Dimmock and Goh, 2011).  This third and present phase 
is thus called the “ability-driven phase”, as policy-makers envisaged that the 
workforce needed new sets of competencies and skills beyond strong academic 
foundations, especially after the onset of the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997. 
Educational policies in the ability-driven phase were designed to increase 
quality, choice, and flexibility in the educational system, with the hope of enabling 
students to develop their talents and compete in the new economy. First, the MOE 
devolved some decision-making responsibilities from headquarters to schools. For 
example, the MOE announced in 2005 that secondary schools had the flexibility to 
use non-academic criteria in student selection, allow academically able students to sit 
for examinations earlier than their peers, and exempt these students from intermediate 
examinations (Shanmugaratnam, 2005).  It also implemented the school cluster 
system to facilitate collaboration and support within moderately sized communities of 
schools in 1997 (Sharpe and Gopinathan, 2002).  However, as schools enjoyed more 
autonomy in decision-making, they also bore greater responsibility for accountability 
Article to be published in Educational Management, Administration & Leadership (in press) 
13 
 
based on student performance, as epitomized in the launch of the School Excellence 
Model (SEM) in 2000 and Master-plan of Awards thereafter (Ng, 2003, 2007).  The 
SEM explicated both critical “enablers” and “key result areas” on which all schools 
were expected to concentrate for effectiveness and report on their progress to the 
MOE annually. Schools were also subjected to external validation once every five to 
six years. The Master-plan recognized schools annually for their innovative processes 
and achievements. 
Second, transformative pedagogies were implemented in schools, following 
the launch of TSLN in 1997 (Ng, 2008b).  “Thinking Schools” epitomized a more 
process-focused learning environment in schools, while “Learning Nation” 
underscored the culture of lifelong learning beyond formal schooling. TSLN was 
reinforced by the MOE’s mission (“Molding the Future of Our Nation”), Desired 
Outcomes of Education (DOEs) summarized the aims of holistic education, and the 
“Teach Less, Learn More” (TLLM) initiative aimed at getting educators to reflect on 
why, what, and how they taught (Gopinathan, 2005; Ng, 2008b; Sharpe and 
Gopinathan, 2002).  In realizing the DOEs in TSLN, the MOE sponsored a raft of 
curricular innovations across schools (Dimmock, 2011; Gopinathan and Deng, 2006).  
Primary and secondary schools could develop their own niche programs. Secondary 
schools had the option to offer new subjects to students. Specialist schools catering to 
the needs of secondary students with non-academic interests were also started. 
Outstanding secondary schools could exempt their top students from the “O” Level 
examinations so that more time could be used for learning instead of preparing for 
assessments (Gopinathan and Deng, 2006).  
 Third, there was a movement toward the professionalization of school leaders 
and teachers. School leaders were exhorted as “chief executive officers” - rather than 
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instructional leaders – and they were expected to take school-based initiatives within 
policy guidelines. Hence, formal leadership training was designed to equip them with 
requisite competencies and skills to manage schools as learning organizations (Ng, 
2008a).  The MOE also stepped up its recruitment and development of teachers. An 
appraisal system launched in 2003 and known as The Enhanced Performance 
Management System (EPMS) required all education officers to set their work targets 
in key result areas and develop competencies and capacities as part of professional 
development (MOE, 2003).  Provisions were made for three different career tracks 
(leadership, teaching and specialized), and teachers were expected to select a track 
after consultation with their leaders. In recognition of the professional status of 
teachers, senior positions within the teaching track have been introduced - such as 
Principal Master Teachers, Master Teachers, Lead Teachers, and Senior Teachers. In 
2009, the MOE mandated the creation of professional learning communities (PLCs) in 
schools to encourage collaboration among teachers within and across schools (MOE, 
2010a).  These PLCs were complemented by the establishment of the Academy of 
Singapore Teachers and six centers of excellence for professional development to 
enable teachers to discuss and share innovative teaching methods (MOE, 2010a).  
Lastly, there has been a proliferation of philosophies cascading from the MOE 
to school leaders and teachers. First, the Philosophy for Educational Leadership for 
school leaders comprised four interrelated principles, namely that educational 
leadership is anchored in values and purpose; inspires all towards a shared vision; is 
committed to growing people; and leads and manages change (MOE, 2008).  The 
second set of philosophical explications, Ethos of the Teaching Profession, is a 
collection of different philosophical declarations related to teachers’ professional 
practice (MOE, 2010b).  These declarations included the Philosophy of Education, 
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Teachers’ Vision, Teachers’ Pledge, and Teachers’ Creed. The third set of 
philosophical explications – the DOEs - seeks to establish a common purpose for 
educators. All these philosophies were purportedly a culmination of shared values and 
thinking among educators, past and present, in the teaching fraternity. Hence, school 
leaders and teachers were expected to constantly reflect on and have regular 
conversations about, these philosophies, which were to guide them in their 
professional conduct and activities.  
Mapping the educational policy landscape from 1965 to the present through its 
three phases reveals just how intertwined is education with the economic and social 
needs of Singapore society, as defined and controlled by the state. Such mapping is 
also essential to an understanding of the evolving nature and form of center (state) - 
periphery (school) relations, the focus of the following section. 
 
Evolution of MOE control: From “direct” to nuanced “steering from close 
proximity” 
Gopinathan and colleagues have consistently maintained that the MOE adopted a 
centralized approach to the formulation and implementation of policies in the first two 
phases of educational development in Singapore (Gopinathan, 2007; Gopinathan and 
Deng, 2006; Gopinathan et al., 2008).  Inarguably, the MOE relied on numerous 
direct policy levers to meet socio-economic imperatives confronting the educational 
landscape in Singapore’s early years of nation-building. These policy levers, 
invariably reflected and ensured the hegemony of the MOE over policy, and were 
exercised by means of mandates, standardization of curriculum and assessment, 
managerialism in the role of school leaders and handbooks to guide them, and 
predefinition of criteria and operational procedures to be used in implementing policy.  
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In contrast to the early phases of educational development, an increasingly 
more subtle and less direct top-down approach to the formulation and implementation 
of policy has emerged during the present ability-driven phase (Gopinathan, 2007; 
Gopinathan and Deng, 2006; Mourshed et al., 2010).  The MOE for example, has 
allowed some schools to practice school-based decision-making, instituted the school 
cluster system to improve two-way communication between schools and MOE 
headquarters, and given various degrees of autonomy to schools, depending on their 
performance – the higher their performance, the greater the degree of autonomy. In 
the process, various neo-liberalist ideas and practices have percolated through the 
educational system (Burchell, 1996; Ng and Chan, 2008).  These neo-liberal elements 
- comprising elements of managerialism, economic rationality, competition, 
performativity, site-based accountability, continuous evaluation, and a reduction of 
direct government involvement - influence primarily the tactical operations of schools 
although they do not impact the marketization of the school sector anywhere near as 
much as they do in say the UK and USA. 
Notwithstanding an increasing degree of school autonomy in the current 
educational landscape, a close examination of the relationship and interactions 
between the centre (MOE) and periphery (schools) suggests that the MOE’s tight grip 
on schools has not loosened; if anything, it has strengthened, albeit indirectly and 
subtly. This observation supports Lingard’s (1993, 1996) contention that the role of 
the state in a decentralized system has not at all diminished; rather it has become more 
multifarious, complex, subtle, and some may even say, competitive and contradictory. 
Using powerful metaphorical language to describe the role of the state, Marceau 
(1993) refers to the centre as increasingly “steering from a distance”. Our analysis of 
current Singapore educational policy-making suggests the MOE exerts its influence 
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on schools in at least four nuanced ways that are markedly different from the outright 
central control of earlier phases. They enable us to claim that the Singapore MOE is 
also increasingly “steering” the system’s policy trajectory, although not from a 
distance – a point that will be discussed later.  Each of the four ways can be thought of 
as strategies, and they are elaborated below. 
 
Strategy 1: “Bounded autonomy” 
In its experimentation with neo-liberalist educational policies, the MOE has been 
judicious in granting various degrees of autonomy in decision-making to schools 
(Gopinathan, 2007; Mok, 2003). Despite the introduction of the first “independent” 
schools in 1987 and “autonomous” schools in 1994, there are still less than thirty of 
such schools out of a total of 360 schools, in Singapore today. The number of private 
schools is even fewer. Furthermore, the MOE maintains its control and influence over 
the independent schools through the School Boards (Incorporation) Act of 1990 
(Chan and Tan, 2008).  This Act provides for the MOE to approve, vary, and even 
revoke governing board constitutions in independent schools. In the extreme case of a 
revocation, the Minister of Education can appoint the Director-General of Education 
to take over the mantle of running the school.  
The MOE also imposes limits on the scope of decision-making autonomy that 
different schools can enjoy (Chan and Tan, 2008).  For instance, all schools are 
required to uphold key policy tenets such as meritocracy, the use of high stakes 
examinations, bilingualism, the use of the English language as the only medium of 
instruction (except for mother tongue languages), and secularity of schools 
emphasizing racial and religious harmony in their practices (Ashforth and Gibbs, 
1990; C. Han, 2009; Shared values, 1991; Tan, 2007).  However, juxtaposing these 
guiding principles - by which schools have to abide - with their relative autonomy in 
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decision-making is not necessarily contradictory, insofar as the former are not 
overwhelmingly detailed and cumbersome (Aglietta, 1979).  This is borne out in the 
following discussion which explicates further strategies by which the MOE exercises 
nuanced control and influence.  
 
Strategy 2: Shifting the locus and changing the form of control         
Apart from limiting the scope of decision-making autonomy schools can enjoy, the 
MOE has devised other means of control and influence to achieve overall policy 
congruence in the system. Ironically, one of these strategies is to shift the locus of 
control from headquarters to schools. Previously, policy directives were 
communicated downwards to schools from the MOE hierarchy for strict compliance. 
In the new strategic interplay, the MOE now introduces policies that are conducive to 
schools exercising self- and peer sanctioning, and self-regulating behavior (Ng, 2010).  
The use of SEM, for instance, as a quality self-validation tool obliges schools to focus 
on “enablers” and key “outcomes” deemed by the MOE to be desirable and 
compatible with important system-wide policy priorities (McKenna and Richardson, 
2009).  Schools must channel their scarce resources toward improving their SEM 
scores as they are subject to rigorous external validations. The Master-plan (McKenna 
and Richardson, 2009) is another case of the MOE exercising nuanced control and 
steerage. Schools are expected to continuously strive to excel in learning domains pre-
determined by the MOE, as explicated in the Master-plan, in order to achieve system-
wide endorsements for their programs. It is a futile effort for schools to pursue a 
trajectory of self-perceived strength that is not ratified in the Master-plan since they 
must attract sufficient students to gain viability and MOE funding. Notwithstanding 
the exchange of information by word of mouth, school choice among parents and 
students - though restricted in Singapore - is often made on the basis of publicly 
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available information on school achievements posted on school websites and 
displayed prominently on publicity banners decorating school compounds. Taken 
together, it can be said that SEM and the Master-plan constitute effective tools of 
“performativity” (Ball, 2003) by which the MOE controls and influences schools. 
Viewed in this light, the MOE appears to be less interested in “de-regulation” than in 
creative “re-regulation” (Ball, 2003: 217). 
The mode of control has also changed in form from impersonal bureaucratic 
instructions and guidelines imposed by the MOE to alignment via high professional 
expectations regulating the fraternity of school leaders and teachers collectively.  
Through powerful processes of induction and socialization, school leaders are 
acculturated into an “MOE default” position on matters of policy expectation in 
regard to the directions in which schools should be led and managed. This is 
evidenced firstly, and most overtly, through the MOE Corporate Values – integrity, a 
focus on people, a passion for learning, and the pursuit of excellence – that are 
enshrined in policy “text” and “discourse” (Ball, 1993, 1994; Bowe, Ball, and Gold, 
1992).  These tend to be subliminally adopted and internalized by school leaders, as is 
the Philosophy for Educational Leadership, which espouses leadership anchored in 
specific values and purpose, inspires a shared vision, and commits to growing people 
and to change. Second, these values are reflected through milestone leadership 
development programs at the NIE through which all aspiring principals must graduate 
(Ng, 2008a).  Third, the MOE priorities are captured in the competencies that teachers 
are expected to demonstrate according to key result areas predefined by the MOE in 
the EPMS developmental-cum-appraisal system (MOE, 2003).  Fourth, the MOE’s 
mandated implementation of PLCs in all schools also binds teachers to engage in 
professional exchange of ideas and sharing of resources on pedagogical, curricular, 
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and assessment strategies among themselves. PLCs afford checks and balances from 
within the fraternity, under the overarching facilitation of school leaders, on the types 
of innovative interventions that are considered positively by the system. Taken 
together, these interventions must meet, and are designed to promote MOE-endorsed 
principles such as meritocracy, racial and religious harmony, and primacy of country 
before self (C. Han, 2009; Shared value, 1991; Tan, 2007). 
 School leaders are also under pressure to be effective leaders since teachers 
are obligated to report on their leadership and influence in the annual SEM self-
validation exercise. Furthermore, all schools must submit the SEM report to the MOE 
at least every two years. The biennial school climate survey conducted in all schools 
also provides another important avenue for teachers to report on their school leaders 
and general school culture. The MOE takes the results of the survey seriously, 
analyzing them, and providing principals with their school own reports in comparison 
with those of other schools across the entire educational system. In this way, school 
leaders’ cognitions and practices are inevitably shaped by teachers’ expectations and 
needs. These checks and balances serve to regulate school leaders’ behavior and 
ensure that they make professional decisions to serve teachers’ professional needs and 
students’ learning needs. 
Borrowing Hargreaves’ (2000) typology of the evolution of teacher 
professionalism, teachers in Singapore may be conceived as having progressed from 
the pre-professional age in the survival-driven phase of educational development, 
through the age of the autonomous professional, to the present age of the collegial 
professional in the ability-driven phase. It is precisely the strong professional culture 
of collaboration and peer influence in the age of the collegial professional that the 
MOE is using to galvanize the fraternity to achieve the MOE’s broad policy intents, 
Article to be published in Educational Management, Administration & Leadership (in press) 
21 
 
and which forms the basis of the McKinsey&Co’s conclusion that Singapore is in the 
“good to great” phase.  
 
Strategy 3: Redefining points of leverage 
The third significant change in control and influence strategy pertains to the MOE 
redefining the points of leverage so as to achieve its policy objectives. In the past, the 
MOE relied on direct and overt ways of controlling the behaviors of school leaders 
and teachers. For example, all policies and administrative procedures by which school 
leaders were expected to abide were enshrined in the Principal’s Handbook. More 
recently, however, the MOE is relying on covert influence strategies, such as 
expecting schools to align their programs to meet the MOE’s espoused DOEs in order 
to realize the TSLN vision. School leaders are expected to imbibe the values 
underpinning leadership explicated in the Philosophy for Educational Leadership. 
These principles are reinforced in professional discourse in meetings at various levels 
- school, cluster, and the MOE.  
Similarly, teachers are rallied to embrace the comprehensive Ethos of the 
Teaching Profession - a culmination of views and perspectives of a large segment of 
the teaching fraternity – prepared, approved, and disseminated by the MOE. This 
ethos comprises a set of core beliefs and tenets that are expected to inform teachers’ 
professional practice (Philosophy of Education), aspirations that they should possess 
(Teachers’ Vision), professional standards that they should uphold (Teachers’ 
Pledge), and exemplary practices and tacit beliefs endorsed by the system (Teachers’ 
Creed). Taken as a whole, the plethora of philosophical explications is indicative of 
the MOE’s change in strategy toward influencing school leaders and teachers 
cognitively and affectively at a subliminal level with the aim of ensuring adherence to 
its policy trajectories. It is a mode of “ ‘hands-off’, self-regulating regulation” 
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(Aglietta, 1979: 101) or steerage at the most fundamental level of cognitions and 
affect – all circumscribed by key government documents (text) and values and 
outcomes that are the basis of professional discussion and mediation (discourse). If 
this constitutes a version of the neo-liberal way (Rose, 1996), it is a distinctly 
Singaporean form of educational policy-making and of neo-liberalism. 
 
Strategy 4: “Personalizing” the hierarchy  
In addition to shifting the locus and changing the form of control in order to maximize 
points of leverage, through the introduction of school cluster system, the MOE has 
“personalized” and thus moderated perceptions of the otherwise vertical and 
impersonal organizational hierarchy. Before the introduction of the cluster system, 
school leaders could only interface with the MOE policy-makers and officers at select 
platforms and through formal communication channels. This model of interaction 
changed with the implementation of the cluster system in the late 1990s. School 
leaders now report to cluster superintendents who also have the responsibilities of 
disseminating the MOE policies, channeling feedback on policy implementation from 
schools up to MOE headquarters, advising schools on their developmental 
trajectories, facilitating sharing and collaboration among schools, and developing 
leadership capacities (Sharpe and Gopinathan, 2002).  These myriad responsibilities 
provide cluster superintendents with different options to engage and influence school 
leaders. Furthermore, each cluster superintendent only supervises a relatively small 
number of school leaders (from 12 to 14 schools), compared with the former period, 
when the MOE was expected to interface with each and every school leader in the 
entire system. From the schools’ perspective, school leaders are able to identify more 
closely with the cluster superintendent than an impersonal MOE headquarters. 
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Consequently, the MOE is able to ensure greater alignment between school practices 
and headquarters’ policies. 
 
Toward a socio-cultural explanation of leadership and policy-making 
Notwithstanding the above description of the circumscribed autonomy of schools in 
the latest phase of educational development, Singapore is synonymous with 
progressive and excellent student performance on international achievement tests. It is 
credited with efforts to implement transformative teaching and learning processes 
aimed at preparing its citizenry for the knowledge-based economy (Dimmock and 
Goh, 2011).  There are high levels of efficiency in resource allocation and usage, and 
impressive returns to investment in education (Barber and Mourshed, 2007; Mourshed 
et al., 2010; The Straits Times, 2011).  Most importantly, Singapore students have 
consistently outperformed peers from other advanced economies in international 
comparative assessments. These successes and innovations may appear to be 
inconsistent and out of keeping with the traditional pejorative expectations of a classic 
educational bureaucracy – maintenance of the status quo, resistance to change, 
insensitivity to changing contexts, risk-averse, inefficiency, ineffectiveness, and poor 
achievement outcomes (Bardhan, 2002; OECD, 2001a, 2001b). 
In endeavoring to understand this paradox, it is first necessary to identify the 
unique characteristics of leadership and policy-making in Singapore beyond the 
notions of centralization, decentralization, and “steering from a distance”, which as 
we have already claimed, appear increasingly inadequate descriptive and explanatory 
terms. To this end, Ho (2003) asserts that Singapore policy-making is best explained 
using a relational model premised on strong reciprocal relationships and 
accountabilities between politicians and citizens, between citizens and bureaucrats, 
and between bureaucrats and politicians. Nonetheless, we argue that even this model 
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does not explain why the Singapore government enjoys moral legitimacy in leading – 
overtly or covertly - from the top. It also does not tell us why schools are continuously 
willing to defer to the MOE leadership and accept circumscribed or “bounded” 
autonomy. 
To understand the baroque nature of leadership in Singapore, we need to take 
cognizance of the larger socio-cultural context from which policy-making emanates, 
particularly the influence of Confucian values and axioms governing relationships in 
an interdependent Asian society. Indeed, Singapore’s government leaders have 
repeatedly alluded to the primacy of salient Confucian values in the city-state (Shared 
values, 1991; Tan, 2007).  These values are underscored in Singapore’s shared 
national values and the curriculum through National Education (NE) messages in 
schools (MOE, 2011; Shared values, 1991).  The endorsement of these values is also 
widely credited for the Asian economic miracle. It has been said that while citizenship 
education in England’s schools means learning about politics, in Singapore, NE 
means learning about values. 
In particular, the emphasis on normative power differentials between different 
pairs of dyads in Confucian culture may explain why there is the continued 
reinforcement of the vertical distance between the ruling elite and the ruled. 
Promulgated as the Five Cardinal Relations – comprising ruler-subject, father-son, 
husband-wife, elder brother-younger sibling, and friend-friend – individuals are 
expected to live up to expectations associated with their roles, especially with regards 
to their dyadic partner (Bond and Hwang, 1986; King and Bond, 1985).  In this 
paradigm, the ruling elite is expected to be benevolent and caring toward their 
subjects while the latter are expected to respect and defer to their masters. This 
reciprocity constitutes an unspoken social compact in society and influences the 
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nature of interactions among different individuals. Hence, we can appreciate the 
legitimacy of the Singapore government (i.e., ruler) exerting a controlling hegemony 
over schools (i.e., subjects). This hegemony is manifested as abject centralization in 
the earlier phases of educational development before 1997 and later as subtle, nuanced 
“steerage” in the ability-driven phase. Nonetheless, unlike despotic and self-serving 
hegemonies, leadership in Singapore has particularistic characteristics in that it is 
strong and directive, yet caring, considerate and moral in its dealings. Farh and Cheng 
(2000) elucidate that this paternalistic form of leadership achieves legitimacy because 
the authoritarian nature of leadership is accompanied with expectations of morality 
and benevolence. Comparing the ruler-subject relationship to that between a father 
and son, Chen and Farh (2010) metaphorically describe the reciprocal relationship as 
follows: 
 “Like the father in a ...  family, the superior ... is expected to 
lead morally by example, maintain authority and control, 
provide guidance, protection, and care to the subordinate; 
like a dutiful son, the subordinate, in return, is obligated to 
be loyal and deferent to the superior.” (p. 602) 
 
Hence, although paternalistic leaders may assert strong authority and control 
over subordinates and demand their unqualified obedience, they demonstrate superior 
moral character and integrity, and a concern for subordinates’ well-being. 
Concomitantly, the latter feel the need to respect and defer to leadership, and 
experience gratitude and obligation to reciprocate the kindness shown. In the 
Singapore context, it is a societal expectation that the government upholds the highest 
standards of professional and moral conduct, and formulates and implements 
educational policies that best serve the country’s needs. In this way, armed with the 
knowledge that the MOE leadership is forward-looking and not self-serving, schools 
are willing to conform to policy dictates from the MOE. Three important qualities of 
the leadership exercised by the Singapore government which are reflected in its 
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policy-making are discernible: high levels of professional competence, pragmatism 
and care for the citizenry, and the sponsorship of change in pursuit of the national 
interest. Each of these is now elaborated. 
 
Competent leadership 
In its recent publication, Capturing the Leadership Premium, McKinsey&Co attribute 
the success of high-performance educational systems to the quality of school 
leadership and the quality of teaching (Barber et al., 2010). While this may be 
considered sufficient for explaining the success of schools in de-regulated systems, 
we aver that the critical need for quality leadership goes beyond schools to the highest 
level of policy-makers and senior bureaucrats, especially in Singapore. This is partly 
explained by the relative absence in Singapore of pluralist checks and balances found 
in Western democracies – and the added trust that thus needs to be placed in honest 
and enlightened politicians and bureaucrats.  Indeed, Singapore places a huge 
premium on the recruitment and management of competent and motivated 
government ministers and senior bureaucrats (Ho, 2003).  Underscoring the 
contributions of the leadership elite (limited to comparatively few in number), 
Singapore’s founding father, Lee Kuan Yew, cautions that “If all the 300 were to 
crash in one Jumbo jet, then Singapore will disintegrate.” (Lee, 1998: 315). 
To ensure commitment and prevent corruption, the government pays 
extremely generous salaries to motivate its political appointees and senior bureaucrats. 
There is also a deliberate policy to rotate office-holders and inject new blood into the 
government regularly. Furthermore, there are high expectations of the bureaucracy. 
Senior civil servants are expected to understand the socioeconomic and political 
environments, anticipate the consequences of their actions, and rise above party 
politics to act in the best interest of the country.  
Article to be published in Educational Management, Administration & Leadership (in press) 
27 
 
The preoccupation with getting the best individuals for leadership transcends 
government leadership to shape the selection of school principals and teachers (Ng, 
2008a).  Besides the normal appraisal, teachers undergo different levels of 
identification and assessment to ascertain their potential to be effective school leaders. 
It also helps that being a small, compact educational system, the MOE and existing 
school principals are very familiar with teachers who have demonstrated their 
competence and consistently shown potential for future school leadership. This 
proximal advantage minimizes the risk of erroneous judgment of teachers’ leadership 
potential and subsequent wrongful appointment of teachers to the principal-ship. With 
attractive salaries and bonuses, career opportunities, and other work benefits, the 
system is also able to attract the top 30% of each graduate cohort to join its teaching 
force. With the support of a coterie of high quality teachers, the MOE is able to 
continuously introduce a flow of initiatives aimed at improving educational outcomes 
in the ability-driven phase of educational development.   
 
Pragmatism 
The second quality characterizing Singapore’s paternalistic leadership relates to the 
principles guiding policy formulation. In the quest for the maintenance of peace and 
its survival in an otherwise potentially hostile Southeast Asian environment, 
Singapore’s leaders have repeatedly emphasized the need for pragmatism in policy-
making (Ho, 2003; Ng and Chan, 2008).  In the process, citizens are urged to put 
community and national interests above their individual rights and to emphasize 
consensus over dissent – characteristic hallmarks of Confucian philosophy. Principles 
such as meritocracy, academic credentialism, bilingualism, and racial and religious 
harmony strongly undergird educational policy in Singapore (C. Han, 2009; Shared 
values, 1991; Tan, 2007).  
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 In regard to meritocracy in particular, educational policies are designed to 
level the playing field so that students can learn and develop according to their 
potential (Tan, 2007). For example, all schools are staffed by well-trained and 
qualified teachers, equipped with enviable state-of-the-art facilities and infrastructure, 
and supported with generous budgets, regardless of the socioeconomic profiles of 
their students. Promotion of students from one level to another, allocation of students 
to different streams in schools, student admission criteria for secondary schools and 
junior colleges (grades 11 and 12), and disbursement of educational awards to 
students - are all strictly merit-based. The use of meritocracy to allocate resources and 
support learning appears to have borne fruit. System-wide statistics provided 
compelling evidence of the state of social mobility in the city-state (The Straits Times, 
2011).  
 
Sponsor of change  
The third leadership characteristics explaining the success of Singapore’s educational 
system lies in the leadership’s advocacy and support for diversity, innovation, and 
teacher professionalism. In realizing the need for innovation and enterprise, the 
Singapore Public Service Division launched the Public Service 21 (PS21) initiative 
espousing a client-centered, market-driven approach to administrative reforms in the 
civil service (PS21 Office, 1996).  The twin objectives of PS 21 were to imbue in civil 
servants the value of service excellence – emphasizing high quality of standards, 
courtesy, and responsiveness - in meeting the needs of the public, and promoting an 
environment which supports continuous improvement for greater efficiency and 
effectiveness (Ho, 2003). 
The endorsement of service excellence and continuous improvement from the 
highest echelons of government has culminated in a plethora of innovative initiatives 
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and policies in the educational sector, as exemplified by the establishment of 
independent and autonomous schools in 1987 and 1994 respectively, TSLN in 1997, 
TLLM in 2004, EPMS in 2003, and PLCs in 2009. Alluding to the complex interplay 
between policy-makers and implementers, – or more conceptually, what Ball and 
colleagues term analysis of policy as text and as discourse (Ball, 1993, 1994; Bowe, 
Ball, and Gold, 1992) – the MOE undertakes consultations with school leaders, 
teachers, parents, and industry partners in the process of formulating policies based on 
its sensitivity to perceived needs.  The involvement of stakeholders takes place 
through a myriad of platforms. For instance, the MOE consulted a wide cross-section 
of stakeholders in the review of the implementation of NE in 2007 (MOE, 2007).  
These stakeholders comprised school leaders, teachers, students, parents, and 
representatives from non-government organizations. Recommendations from the 
review committee subsequently informed the trajectory of NE policy for schools.  
The three qualities described are illustrative of a paternalistic style of 
leadership in the Singapore educational system. This paternalistic characterization 
appears more apt and culturally informed as an explanatory descriptor of educational 
policy-making in Singapore than simple categorical notions of centralization or 
decentralization. It deserves reiterating that this brand of Singaporean paternalism is 
not synonymous with the notion of totalitarian, despotic political control exerted by a 
political and bureaucratic leadership that is obsessed with the interference and 
curtailment of the rights of the population so as to serve its selfish interests. On the 
contrary, it is characterized by an unspoken social compact between Singapore’s 
political and bureaucratic leadership and schools that the former will pursue 
enlightened policies - predicated on enshrined principles of meritocracy and 
incorruptibility introduced by Lee Kuan Yew and other founding fathers - that serve 
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the best interests of the nation. This obliges schools to trade off some of their 
autonomy for the larger good of all in a collectivistic society. As Chang (2011) puts it:  
Every five years, the party seeks the people's mandate, when that has been 
given, as it has been in every election over five decades, the leadership governs 
decisively, with lightning speed and an iron hand. The voters do not ask too 
many questions nor agitate for populist policies; they are asked to trust as a 
placid citizenry. In return, the Government promises to stay un-corrupt and 
make decisions for their best long-term interests. For five decades now, this has 
been the Singaporean social compact. 
 
Paternalism as an indigenous conceptualization of leadership provides an 
explanation of the educational landscape in Singapore where schools are generally 
willing to accept the overall leadership and governance of the ruling elite. Indeed, in 
contrast to the typical approach of governments “steering from a distance” as seems 
the case in many Western democracies with neo-liberal educational systems 
(Marceus, 1993), the most compelling description of Singapore educational leadership 
and policy-making in its current phase of development is “steering through 
paternalism from close proximity”. The propitious effects of MOE’s proximal 
steerage is made possible because of  the nexus of intimate working relationships 
among the different stakeholders – the MOE, school clusters, schools, and the 
country’s monopoly teacher training institute, the NIE – in Singapore’s small, 
compact educational system.  Furthermore, the reciprocal and close partnership 
between the center-periphery, that is, the ruler (MOE) and ruled (schools) – is 
regarded as both synergistic and productive. Indeed, the worldwide admiration and 
recognition for the Singapore brand of education attests to the efficacy of paternalism 
in leadership and policy-making in a characteristically Asian context. 
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Conclusion 
Our exegesis of leadership and policy-making in the Singapore educational system 
has illustrated how the MOE has exerted its control and influence over schools either 
directly through top-down centralized policy-making in the earlier phases of 
educational development (before 1997) or through “steering through paternalism 
from  close proximity” in the current ability-driven phase (after 1997). Significantly, 
despite this unwavering desire of Singapore leaders to exert control and influence 
over schools, a distinctive and highly effective educational system has evolved over 
less than half a century. Indeed, the Singapore brand of education and particularly its 
policy-making differs from that found in educational systems in other first-world, 
especially multi-party Western democracies. In such Western democracies, general 
elections often lead to changes of governing party, with attendant and concomitant 
changes of educational values and ideology underpinning government policy. In 
contrast, educational policy in Singapore has been under the control of one political 
party (PAP) since 1965. Consequently, Singapore leadership and policy-making has 
become renowned for its consistency and coherence; for an evolutionary rather than 
capricious or radical approach to policy-making; for a sensitivity to the social and 
economic interests of the people; for its awareness of the need for geopolitical 
security, nationhood, and non-partisan pragmatism; for its ingenuity in local 
adaptation of international best practice; and finally, for the dominant role played by 
an enlightened bureaucracy in the whole policy-making process. Undoubtedly, these 
qualities have created significant public value (Moore, 1995) in the city-state’s 
educational processes and outcomes, thereby benefiting students and providing a 
distinctively different way of making policy in comparison with Anglo-Saxon 
counterparts.      
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In reconciling the paradoxes between this high level of neo-conservative 
control and high performance normally associated with a neo-liberal educational 
system (Apple, 2004), we have argued that a paternalistic model of leadership as a 
conceptual apparatus affords an appropriate understanding and account. This model 
recognizes the importance of socio-cultural contextual influences that shape leader-
subordinate dynamics and relations. It provides a plausible explanation of why -
schools are willing to defer to an enlightened leadership in policy-making so as to 
achieve synergies and positive educational outcomes – whether center-periphery 
relations are top-down, or more nuanced through MOE’s “steering through 
paternalism from close proximity”. 
We contend that this paternalistic model of leadership is a more useful 
heuristic device - compared with notions of centralization, decentralization, and 
“steering from a distance” - in enabling us to better understand the subtleties of the 
center-periphery relationship in Singapore education. It begs the question of how 
generalizable it is as an explanatory model of policy-making for other East Asian 
Confucian societies, namely China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Korea, and Japan. As a case 
in point, western critics of developed Asian education systems often claim a 
connection between their directive governments, an over-reliance on formal teacher-
centered curricular and pedagogy, and the consequent lack of creativity and 
innovation among students. However, Biggs and Watkins’ (1996) – while agreeing 
that the Chinese teacher demonstrates a heavy reliance on didactic teaching, and the 
Chinese student on rote learning – go on to argue that such an approach is invariably 
culturally-based: that is, the Chinese teacher and learner sees rote learning as the 
necessary prior step to subsequent manipulation of the data and higher-level cognitive 
skills (including creativity) rather than as an end in itself (Dimmock, 2000).  
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Nonetheless, it is true that the Singapore MOE – indicative of other 
governments of developed Confucian societies - is keen to promote more creativity 
among students, as members of its prospective future workforce. Lim (2012) for 
instance, reports that while Singapore schools have become global role models in 
terms of consistently high test results, the MOE now wants to move beyond this to 
cultivate creativity and ‘holistic education’. The Singapore Minister for Education in a 
2012 speech claimed that education is less about content knowledge and more about 
how to process information. Schools will be given more leeway to come up with 
creative ways to teach the syllabus (Lim, 2012). Paradoxically, it may be that strong 
Asian governments – such as Singapore’s - direct schools to assert more teacher and 
school-based initiatives – thereby illustrating the applicability of the paternalistic 
leadership model espoused in this paper. 
The issue of connectivity between directive Asian governments, over-reliance 
in schools on teacher-centered forms of pedagogy, memorization and rote learning 
methods leading to a lack of creativity – is further complicated by evidence for 
Confucian societies generally showing that they score highly in international 
comparisons of innovation and competitiveness vis-à-vis other non-Confucian 
countries worldwide. For example, in the Global Innovation Index 2012 compiled by 
INSEAD and the World Intellectual Property Organization, Singapore (3rd), Hong 
Kong (8th), Japan (25th), China (34th) were ranked highly out of a total of 141 
economies worldwide (Dutta, 2012). Similarly, in the Global Competitiveness Report 
(2011-2012) by the World Economic Forum, these same Confucian societies were 
ranked highly amongst 142 economies globally (Singapore 2nd, Japan 9th, Hong Kong 
11th, Taiwan 13th, Korea 24th, China 26th) (Schwab, 2011). At the risk of 
simplification, it may be argued that paternalistic leadership, premised on Confucian 
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heritage as a common cultural denominator, has at least played a propitious role in 
contributing to the overall positive performance in these societies. Interestingly, this 
performance provides contrary evidence to detractors that top-down systems per se 
may compromise creative and critical thinking (McCreedy, 2004). It has to be 
acknowledged that there is considerable variation among the performances of 
Confucian economies – although all of them tend to have excelled. To the extent that 
variations exist, they may be attributable to indigenous differences in governance 
systems and policies, and qualitative differences in the degree of application of the 
paternalistic leadership model amongst these different Confucian societies. 
Consequently, with regards to the external validity of the model, we wonder whether 
this paternalistic style of leadership can reconcile the tension between Asian 
governments’ imperative to maintain strong central control and the realization that 
many 21st century educational reforms are founded on more autonomy for schools and 
teachers going forward. This tension will be a key future issue confronting the 
governments and peoples of Singapore and other Confucian societies.  
Furthermore, notwithstanding the efficacy of paternalism in Singapore to date, 
one cannot but wonder if the tacit requirements of paternalistic leadership – namely, 
that it is honest, competent and caring with a goal of pursuing policies in the best 
interests of the nation - can continue to be met in the future. The answer surely lies in 
the degree to which there is societal agreement on what constitutes the nation’s best 
interests. Alignment on this question is more likely in times of economic growth and 
prosperity – such as Singapore and most of Asia is presently experiencing. However, 
some questions loom over the horizon as Singapore traverses the fifth decade of its 
nationhood. Can the Singapore government continue to attract competent and 
motivated people to fill its ranks in leadership renewal? Can it bridge the gradually 
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increasing social inequality between the “haves” and “have-nots” (Apple, 2004)? 
Lastly, how will the social compact between the leadership elite and citizens be 
contested in the face of growing democratic calls from an educated citizenry for their 
voices to be heard? Admittedly, these are difficult questions for Singapore’s leaders 
and its style of policy-making that will require answers (Han, Zuraidah, Chua, Lim, 
Low, Lin, and Chan, 2011), as Singapore continues its journey from “good to great” 
and on to the ultimate phase of educational excellence. 
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